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PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
following is a complete list of all parties to the District Court proceedings that are the
subject of this appeal, and their respective party designations in those proceedings:
1.

PIONEER BUILDERS COMPANY OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada
corporation a/k/a PIONEER BUILDERS OF NEVADA, a Nevada
corporation a/k/a PIONEER BUILDERS, a Nevada corporation; Plaintiff

2.

KDA CORPORATION, a Utah corporation a/k/a KDA CORPORATION
a/k/a K.D.A. CORPORATION a/k/a THE K.D.A. CORPORATION a/k/a
K.D.A. CORPORATION PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah corporation;
Defendant

3.

UNITED WEST INVESTMENTS GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation;
Defendant

4.

S. DENISE HARDY; Defendant

5.

JOSEPH L. HARDY; Defendant

6.

DALE RIDD; Defendant

7.

MARTA RIDD; Defendant

8.

MARCEL J. SCHWAGER; Defendant

9.

SANDRA S. SCHWAGER; Defendant

10.

LYNN C. ANDERSEN, aka LYNN L. ANDERSEN, aka LYNN C.
ANDERSON, aka LYNN L. ANDERSON; Defendant

11.

ROBERT GONZALES; Defendant

12.

SHERI GONZALES; Defendant

13.

MICHAEL BUDD; Defendant

14.

TRUDI BUDD; Defendant
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15.

HAROLD J. KAY; Defendant

16.

WILLIAM R.GLASER,aka BILL GLASSER; Defendant

17.

LAURIE A. GLASER; Defendant

18.

DONNA L. ELMQUIST; Defendant

19.

BRENT RHEES; Defendant

20.

GINGER RHEES; Defendant

21.

SHYREAL D. JENSEN; Defendant

22.

INGE L. JENSEN; Defendant

23.

JOHN D. SMIDT, trustee of the John D. Smidt and Linda L. Smidt
Revocable Trust U/I/D October 7, 1999; Defendant

24.

LINDA L. SMIDT, trustee of the John D. Smidt and Linda L. Smidt
Revocable Trust U/I/D October 7, 1999; Defendant

25.

THE JOHN D. SMIDT AND LINDA L. SMIDT REVOCABLE TRUST
U/I/D OCTOBER 7, 1999; Defendant

26.

RANDALL HUNTER; Defendant

27.

RONALD HUNTER; Defendant

28.

KAY HUNTER; Defendant

29.

DANIEL HUNTER; Defendant

30.

MARK B. HANCEY; Defendant

31.

HANCEY & ASSOCIATES, P.C, a Utah professional corporation;
Defendant

32.

ROD W. CUSHING dba ALLIANCE FINANCIAL, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company; Defendant

33.

CLINT THOMPSON; Defendant
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34.

CAROLYN THOMPSON; Defendant

35.

LARRY H. ANDERSEN, aka LARRY ANDERSON; Defendant

36.

BILL BREINHOLT; Defendant

37.

SHAWNA BREINHOLT; Defendant

38.

TIMOTHY J. KENDELL; Defendant

39.

SCOTT HAYES; Defendant

40.

LENARD HANZLICK; Defendant

41.

KATHRYN J. HANZLICK; Defendant

42.

DOROTHY STEADMAN; Defendant

43.

DOUG PUGMIRE; Defendant

44.

NORINE PUGMIRE; Defendant

45.

GREGORY LARSEN; Defendant

46.

GLADE LARSEN, aka GLADE L. LARSEN; Defendant

47.

CORALIE LARSEN; Defendant

48.

RICHARD ROBERTS, aka RICHARD D. ROBERTS; Defendant

49.

CAROL ROBERTS; Defendant

50.

BOYD SMITH, aka BOYD A. SMITH, as Trustee of The Boyd A. Smith
and Carolyn G. Smith Family Trust; Defendant

51.

CAROLYN G. SMITH, as Trustee of The Boyd A. Smith and Carolyn G.
Smith Family Trust; Defendant

52.

THE BOYD A. and CAROLYN G. SMITH FAMILY TRUST; Defendant

53.

LARRY CALL; Defendant

54.

KAREN CALL; Defendant
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55.

HARLAN TAYLOR; Defendant

56.

RANAE TAYLOR; Defendant

57.

JOHN F. GUNN; Defendant

58.

BECKY CUTLER-GUNN; Defendant

59.

JOHN L. WILLIAMSON; Defendant

60.

DAVE WARNICK; Defendant

61.

DEWEY GARNER; Defendant

62.

JASON THOMPSON; Defendant

63.

GLADE W. DAVIS; Defendant

64.

OWEN BROWER; Defendant

65.

SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah
corporation; Defendant

66.

NICTREE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Utah limited partnership;
Defendant

67.

JOHN DOES I-XXX; and JANE DOES I-XXX; Defendants
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Section 78A-3-102 of the Utah Code.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Whether the District Court erred in applying "inquiry notice" to rank
priority of interests in real property, rather than the general default rule of record notice
for determining priority in the order documents are recorded pursuant to Utah's recording
statute.
Standard of Review:

This is a determination of law which is reviewed for

correctness. Particularly, since the District Court decided this case on summary
judgment, the appellate court must "review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002
UT 95, If 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, *{ 9, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted).
Demonstration that Issue No. 1 Was Preserved in the District Court: The
applicability of inquiry notice was the central issue of the Defendants' cross-motions for
summary judgment, and of Plaintiff s oppositions to those cross-motions. (E.g., R. 3632,
R. 3639, R. 3670, R. 3677, R. 4146 - 4179, R. 4180 - 4205, and R. 4206 -4247). The
issue also was the subject of various post-summary judgment objections and briefing,
including a motion by Plaintiff for reconsideration. (E.g., R. 4738 - 4766, R. 4799 4803, R. 4813 - 4832, R. 4804 - 4812, R. 4844 - 4852, and R. 4865 - 4873).
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Issue No. 2: Whether the District Court further erred in determining on the facts
of this case that there was any duty for the Plaintiff below, now the Appellant Pioneer
Builders Company of Nevada, Inc. ("Pioneer"), to inquire into the existence of any
claimed interests in the subject real property beyond and outside of those reflected in the
records of the county recorder, including by granting summary judgment to Defendants
under an "inquiry notice" analysis where there were genuine disputes of material facts
claimed as the bases for imposing a duty of "inquiry notice" upon Pioneer.
Standard of Review:

"Summary judgment is proper only when 'there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 'In determining whether the lower court
correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party.' In other
words, 'we review the factual submissions to the District Court in a light most favorable
to finding a material issue of fact.' Moreover, '[i]n reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review them
for correctness.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(citations omitted).
Demonstration that Issue No, 2 Was Preserved in the District Court: The
presence of fact disputes material to the District Court's "inquiry notice" analysis, and
thus precluding summary judgment for Defendants on inquiry notice, was a central issue
briefed by Pioneer in opposition to the Defendants' cross-motions for summary
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judgment. {E.g., R. 4180 - 4205 and R. 4206 - 4247). The presence of such material
disputes of claimed inquiry notice facts also was the subject of various post-summary
judgment objections and briefing, including a motion by Pioneer for reconsideration.
{Kg., R. 4738 - 4766, R. 4799 - 4803, R. 4813 - 4832, R. 4804 - 4812, R. 4844 - 4852,
and R. 4865 -4873).

Issue No. 3: Whether the District Court erred in its interpretation, as a part of its
"inquiry notice" analysis, of the language and effect of the deeds to the grantors of the
trust deeds Pioneer seeks to foreclose in this case.
Standard of Review: Interpretation of a deed is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness, unbound by and not subject to any presumption of correctness
for the District Court's conclusions. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979).
Demonstration that Issue No, 3 Was Preserved in the District Court: The
subject of Issue No. 3 was discussed as a part of Pioneer's opposition to the Budd
Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment and in Pioneer's reply memorandum in
support of ts own summary judgment motion (R. 4206-4247 and 4146-4179). That issue
also was the subject of briefing in a post-summary judgment objection (R. 4738-4766).

Issue No, 4: Whether the District Court erred in its interpretation and application
of various documents and statutes as to their effect upon a certain parcel of the subject
real property identified and referred to in the District Court proceedings (and in this brief)
as "Parcel -025, including documents identified and referred to below in this brief as
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Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed, Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, Corrective
Affidavit, and Settlement Deed, and Utah statutes expressly providing for corrective
affidavits and for retroactive application of after-acquired title.
Standard of Review: Interpretation of real estate documents and statutory
interpretation both present questions of law which are reviewed for correctness, with no
presumption of correctness for the District Court's interpretation. Hartman v. Potter, 596
P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,1J17, 977 P.2d
1201,1203.
Demonstration that Issue No. 4 Was Preserved in the District Court: The
subjects of Issue No. 4 were discussed in Pioneer's oppositions to Defendants' crossmotions for summary judgment and in Pioneer's reply memorandum in support of its
own motion for summary judgment. (R. 4206-4247 and 4146-4179.)

Issue No. 5: Whether the District Court erred in granting priority to certain of the
Filing Defendants who admittedly had not paid their contracts in full, where the face and
plain language of their contracts expressly and indisputably provided that they would not
obtain any interest in any property until they paid in full.
Standard of Review:

This is a determination of law which is reviewed for

correctness. Particularly, since the District Court decided this case on summary
judgment, the appellate court must "review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002
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UT 95,1| 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, \ 9, 40 P.3d 581 ) (internal quotations omitted).
Demonstration that Issue No. 5 Was Preserved in the District Court: The
subject of Issue No. 5 was discussed in briefing on post-summary judgment objections,
and in connection with a further motion as to issues pertaining to "Payment Lots" as that
term is hereinafter defined. (R. 4738-4766 and 5272-5278.)

CONTROLLING STATUTES
The following controlling statutes are applicable to this appeal:
Utah Code § 57-3-102(1) (2005):
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, or certified copy of a
document complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each
copy of a notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing
statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged,
shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impact
notice to all persons of their contents.
Utah Code § 57-3-103(2) (2005):
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
Utah Code § 57-1-20 (2006):
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of an
obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a
beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property
acquired by the trustor, or the trustor's successors in interest, subsequent to the
execution of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for the
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obligation or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed as if acquired
before execution of the trust deed.
Utah Code § 57-3-106(8) (2006):
Minor typographical or clerical errors in a document of record may be
corrected by the recording of an affidavit or other appropriate instrument.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from various summary judgment rulings as to the priority of certain
interests claimed in various parts and portions of an approximately 40-acre parcel of real
property being developed as an RV park (the "Property") near Bear Lake, in Rich
County, Utah.
Pioneer filed this case seeking, principally, to foreclose upon three trust deeds
encumbering the Property (collectively, "Pioneer's Trust Deeds"). (See Complaints and
Amended Complaints at R. 3, 63, 582, and 2629.) Pioneer's Trust Deeds were pledged as
collateral for loans extended by Pioneer to the developers of the RV park property in the
total principal amount of $1,150,000.00. Pioneer filed a motion for summary judgment
("Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion") to foreclose its Trust Deeds as against the
developers' interests in the overall 40-acre Property and the interests of numerous other
defendants to various individual pads, lots, units, easements and other parts or interests
within the overall 40-acre Property. (R. 2962, 2965, and 2985.)
Out of all of the defendants named in the case, only two limited groups of them
opposed Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion (which groups were referred to in the
District Court briefing, and are referred to hereinafter, as the "Anderson Defendants"

4850-4696-9353

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
fi may contain errors.

and the "Budd Defendants," respectively, and are occasionally referred to hereinafter
collectively as the "Filing Defendants"). Those Filing Defendants each claimed various
leasehold, membership, and easement interests in or pertaining to various individual
subdivided pads, lots, or units within the overall 40-acre Property, for seasonal
recreational use, including for parking and hookup of recreational vehicles.
Pioneer's Trust Deeds indisputably were recorded before any of the Filing
Defendants recorded any documents evidencing any of the Filing Defendants' claimed
interests. As a matter of law, therefore, the Filing Defendants' claims and interests are all
junior and inferior to, and subject to foreclosure by, Pioneer's Trust Deeds pursuant to
Utah's recording statute, which was the basis for Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion.
The Defendants, however, each filed cross-motions for summary judgment with their
oppositions to Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion (collectively, "Filing Defendants9
Summary Judgment Cross-Motions"). (E.g., R. 3632, 3639, 3670, and 3677.) They
argued they actually had priority over Pioneer's Trust Deeds because Pioneer purportedly
was on "inquiry notice" of the Defendants' claimed, but admittedly unrecorded, interests
before Pioneer recorded its Trust Deeds. They argued that Pioneer had a duty to conduct
some unspecified inquiry outside of and beyond the country records looking for their
unrecorded interests, that inquiry would have led Pioneer to learn of their unrecorded
interests, that Pioneer therefore is deemed to have been on notice of the existence of their
unrecorded interests, and thus that Pioneer's Trust Deeds are actually junior, subject, and
inferior to the Defendants' interests that admittedly were not of record when Pioneer
recorded its Trust Deeds.
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On May 10, 2007, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision (R. 4366 4388 (the "Initial Decision55)), granting Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion in part,
ruling the loans Pioneer made were in default, that Pioneer was owed on those loans the
amounts and items specified by Pioneer, and that Pioneer was entitled to foreclose its
Trust Deeds as against some of the interests of some of the parties to some of the various
individual subdivided pads, lots, or units within the overall 40-acre Property based on
record notice priority. (Id. at R. 4385.)
The District Court's Initial Decision, however, also granted both of the
Defendants' Summary Judgment Cross-Motions. Despite Pioneer's disputes of the
material facts relied upon by the District Court as the bases for applying it, and despite
those facts being insufficient as a matter of law in any event to apply it, the District Court
ruled that Pioneer was charged with "inquiry notice55 of the interests of the filing
Defendants, and therefore that Pioneer's Trust Deeds "are inferior to the property
interests of these [Filing] Defendants" and further that Pioneer's "foreclosure shall be
subject to all interests claimed by the [Filing] Defendants as leaseholders and right of
way holders as set forth in this [Initial] Decision." (Id.)
The Anderson Defendants circulated various proposed judgments to embody the
inquiry notice ruling of the District Court's Initial Decision. (E.g., R.4611,4555, and
4890.) Pioneer filed various objections to the proposed judgments, including addressing
issues affecting priority of a certain handful of individual lots based on their location (the
"Location Lots") and issues affecting priority of certain other lots based on whether the
parties claiming them had paid for them (the "Payment Lots"). (E.g} R. 4442, 4583, and
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4804.) After extensive briefing on the objections by all affected parties, and a hearing
held before the District Court on March 20, 2008, the District Court issued a new
Memorandum Decision on March 26, 2008 (R. 4776 - 4782( the "March 2008
Memorandum Decision")).
In its March 2008 Memorandum Decision the District Court retreated from the
inquiry notice theory it had previously used for all Filing Defendants, and ruled that the
interests of claimants to the Location Lots actually could be junior to and subject to
foreclosure by Pioneer's Trust Deeds after all, depending on whether they were located in
one certain parcel of the Property rather than another, based on record notice priority of
Pioneer's Trust Deeds on one of those parcels pursuant to Utah's recording statute.
Over Pioneer's objection (R. 4804 - 4812), and despite Pioneer's motion for
reconsideration of the Initial Decision's application of inquiry notice in light of the
March 2008 Memorandum Decision recognizing the primacy of record notice (R. 4799,
4813, 4844, and 4883), on January 6, 2009 the District Court entered what was captioned
as the Second Corrected Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order Granting
Motions for Summary Judgment and Order Pursuant to the Court's December 10, 2008
Memorandum Decision (identified and referred to in this brief as the "January 2009
Judgment and Order" (R. 4906-4919). The January 2009 Judgment and Order applied
inquiry notice priority as to most of the Filing Defendants, but expressly reserved priority
as to the Location Lots to be determined based on record notice (R. 4916-4917).
Eventually, the District Court ruled the Location Lots were indeed located in one
certain parcel of the Property, so it entered an Updated Order and Judgment of Priority
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and Foreclosure of Location Lots on December 16, 2009 (identified and referred to
below in this brief as the "December 2009 Judgment on Location Lots" (R. 5079),
applying statutory record notice priority as to the Location Lots. The decisions
recognizing the primacy of Utah's recording statute over and instead of inquiry notice as
to that small group within the group Filing Defendants claiming interests in the Location
Lots were correct and have not been challenged by any party so they are final. But they
highlight the impropriety of applying inquiry notice instead to govern the priority of all of
the other Filing Defendants.
The January 2009 Judgment and Order also indicated the interests of certain of the
Filing Defendants in the Payment Lots "is subject to further hearing to determine which
of the [Payment] Lots have been fully paid for, to what extent payment has or has not
been rendered and ultimately what affect [sic] the foregoing Defendants' payments (in
full or in part) or the lack thereof have on the foregoing Defendants' priorities." (R.
4917.) In a further motion for judgment as to the priority of the Payment Lots, Pioneer
showed the contracts for the claimants' interests in those lots expressly required payment
in full before those claimants would even become entitled to any interest in any of the
Payment Lots, and that none of the claimants to any of those lots, by their own
admissions, had paid off their contract in full. {E.g. R. 5126, 5132, and 5272.)
The District Court ultimately held that notwithstanding that contractual language,
and notwithstanding those Defendants' admitted failure to pay in full under their
contracts, these Defendants nevertheless had priority over Pioneer's Trust Deeds based
on the inquiry notice theory under its January 2009 Judgment and Order. {Order
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Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment of Priority Over Certain l<Payment Lots "
Pursuant to the Court's 2009 Judgment and Order entered on August 24, 2010, identified
and referred to in this brief as the "August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots".) (R.
5323-5329).
The January 2009 Judgment and Order, the December 2009 Judgment on Location
Lots, and the August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots are occasionally referred to
hereinafter collectively as the "Foreclosure-Related Rulings and Judgments," and all
have been certified as final for this appeal in and by an Order Certifying as Final Under
Rule 54(b) the Foreclosure-Related Rulings and Judgments, entered December 14, 2010.
(R. 5408-5444). That certification order, together with the copies of the ForeclosureRelated Rulings and Judgments that were attached to it and which it certified as final for
appeal, is all attached hereto collectively as Addendum 4. The Initial Decision, the
March 2008 Memorandum Decision and the December 2008 Memorandum Decision
leading up to the entry of the Foreclosure-Related Rulings and Judgments also are
attached hereto, as Addenda 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
There was no dispute below, nor is there any question in this appeal, that the
promissory notes to Pioneer for which Pioneer's Trust Deeds serve as security are in
default, as to the amounts due and owing under them to Pioneer, nor as to Pioneer's
general right to foreclose. It is the District Court's decision applying inquiry notice as to
the priority of Pioneer's Trust Deeds that is the core subject of this appeal. Pioneer
appeals the District Court's erroneous and inconsistent rulings as to applicability at all of
inquiry notice in and to this case, as a matter of law, rather than the general default rule of
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record notice priority pursuant to Utah's recording statute which instead should govern
this case. Pioneer further appeals the District Court's improper grant of summary
judgment imposing inquiry notice where the facts claimed as the basis for application of
that theory were disputed. Pioneer also appeals the District Court's determinations as to
the language and effect of certain deeds and other documents and statutes that contributed
to the erroneous application of inquiry notice in this case.
This Court should reverse the District Court, declare as a matter of law that record
notice priority should be uniformly applied to all of the interests of all of the parties to
this case, and declare Pioneer's Trust Deeds therefore indisputably are prior and superior
as a matter of law to all interests of all defendants in all of the Property.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Record Priority Facts
1.

On November 17, 2000, Pioneer caused to be recorded in the office of the

Rich County Recorder a "Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents" of which Pioneer was
the beneficiary ("Pioneer's First Trust Deed"), which was granted as security for a loan
Pioneer had made in the principal sum of Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($900,000.00).
(January 2009 Judgment and Order atfflf2 & 3 (R. 5416-5418) included in Addendum 4
hereto). A certified copy of Pioneer's First Trust Deed was attached to Pioneer's
Summary Judgment Memo as an exhibit at R. 3006-3014, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum 5.
2.

On August 14, 2001, Pioneer caused to be recorded in the office of the Rich

County Recorder two additional trust deeds, one entitled "Modification of Trust Deed"
("Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed"), and one entitled "Trust Deed with Assignment of
Rents" ("Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed"), each of which was granted as security
for Pioneer's loan of additional funds in the total principal face amount of One Million
Five Hundred and Ten Thousand Dollars ($1,510,000.00).* (January 2009 Judgment and
Order atfflf2-4 (R. 5416-5418) included in Addendum 4 hereto). Certified copies of
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and of Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed were attached

The August 2001 loan was for "new money" in the amount of Eight Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($800,000.00) on top of and in addition to the amounts that remained owing at
that time on the first loan mentioned above, for a total cumulative outstanding loan
balance of One Million Five Hundred and Ten Thousand Dollars ($1,510,000.00).
(January 2009 Judgment and Order at ^ 4 (R. 5418) included in Addendum No. 4 hereto).
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to Pioneer's Summary Judgment Memo as exhibits at R. 3020-3028 and R. 3030-3038,
respectively, copies of which are attached hereto as Addendum Nos. 6 and 7.
3.

Pioneer's First Trust Deed on its face expressly included and described

three parcels of real property in Rich County, Utah, respectively bearing Rich County
Tax Identification Nos. 41-08-00-036, 41-08-00-037, and 41-08-00-038. (January 2009
Judgment and Order atfflf2 & 3 (R. 5416-5418) included in Addendum 4 hereto; see also
Pioneer's First Trust Deed attached hereto as Addendum 5).
4.

Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed

each on their faces expressly included and described the same three parcels of real
property that were included and described in Pioneer'-s First Trust Deed, and also an
additional fourth parcel of property in Rich County, Utah, bearing Rich County Tax
Identification No. 41-08-00-025 (hereinafter, "Parcel -025"). (January 2009 Judgment
and Order atfflf2-4 (R. 5416-5418) included in Addendum 4 hereto; see also Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed attached hereto as
Addendum Nos. 6 and 7, respectively).
5.

Indisputably, none of the defendants in this case recorded with the Rich

County Recorder's Office any documents evidencing their respectively-claimed interests
in any part or portion of the overall 40-acre Property that is the subject of this case until
after Pioneer's Trust Deeds were recorded (and some of the defendants never recorded
their claimed interests at all even up to the time Pioneer filed its summary judgment
motion in this case). Attached hereto as Addendum 8 is a table showing the individuals
and entities who are named as defendants in this case and the documents recorded by
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them in the office of the Rich County Recorder, on the dates noted, evidencing their
respective claims and interests in and to various portions of the Property. Certified
copies of each of the recorded documents referenced in that table were attached to
Pioneer's Summary Judgment Memo collectively as an exhibit (at R. 3040-3195),
additional copies of which are attached hereto collectively as Addendum 9.

Claimed Facts Relied Upon for Inquiry Notice Ruling
6.

In contravention of the indisputable record notice priority of Pioneer's

Trust Deeds, the Filing Defendants argued and the District Court held that Pioneer
purportedly was on "inquiry notice" of (and therefore the Pioneer Trust Deeds were
junior to) the Filing Defendants' claims and interests, because at the time Pioneer's Trust
Deeds were recorded:
a.

The portions of the Property on which Filing Defendants claimed an

interest were a part of larger tracts making up the entire Property which had been
platted essentially for subdivision and overall development with multiple lot
owners or leaseholders, with RV park regulations, articles of incorporation and
bylaws, having been recorded for the overall 40-acre Property as far back as 1988.
(Initial Decision, atffif1 & 5 (R. 4367 and 4370) included as Addendum lhereto);
see also exhibits 47 and 48 of the Anderson Defendants' Exhibits to Reply in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (filed in two parts, beginning,
respectively at R. 3240 and R. 3417).
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b.

"Several leasehold interests ([of people who are not parties to this

case] virtually identical to those of the [Filing] Defendants, except on different
Lots) were recorded prior to the recording of the Pioneer trust deeds." (Initial
Decision, Tf 4 (R. 4369) included as Addendum lhereto).
c.

"Prior to recording any of the Pioneer trust deeds; Pioneer, or its

agents, had knowledge that KDA had leased many of the sites in the Recreational
Vehicle (RV) Park/' (Initial Decision, H 17 (R. 4372)), which conclusion appeared
to be based upon the District Court's statements that an appraisal allegedly "was
commissioned by Steve Baugh to induce Ralph Call, president of Pioneer, and
brother-in-law of Steve Baugh, to finance United West's purchase of the

•

properties," which allegedly "included descriptions of leaseholds that had been
sold to various people (Initial Decision,fflf7 and 16 (R. 4370 and 4372)).
d.

"Prior to the recording of [Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and

Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed on August 14, 2001,] which pledges the
property in which most of these Defendants claim an interest (ID #025),
Defendants were in possession of and made improvements to their leased property,
including concrete pads, fences, posts, parking, gravel driveways, power meters,
planted trees, flowers and gardens, sprinkler systems, lawns, landscaping, patio
furniture, a fire pit, family signs, among others [the others noted by the District
Court were a storage shed on one lot, a rock wall on one lot and installing stairs, a
water hook up and sewer line on two lots]. There were individual Utah Power and
Light meters to each lot and recreational vehicles parked on the leased properties."

4850-4696-9353

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

(Initial Decision, 118 (R. 4373) included as Addendum 1 hereto; id, 1fl[ 6, 25, 26
& 27 (R. 4370, and R. 4374).
e.

"In approximately April of 2001, Ralph Call and Steve Baugh

personally visited the property, giving Pioneer actual knowledge of the
Defendants' uses and improvements of the property to the extent these were
visible." (Initial Decision, ^ 21 (R. 4373) included as Addendum 1 hereto).
f.

After August 14, 2001, but prior to September 24, 2002, various of

the defendants had made substantial and open use of and improvements to their
lots. (Initial Decision,ffif36, 37, 38 (R. 4376-4377) included as Addendum 1
hereto).
7.

*

There were disputes of facts that were material to the District Court's

inquiry notice analysis and ruling, thus precluding summary judgment for Defendants on
their summary judgment motions, including:
a.

The District Court's statement that a certain appraisal "was

commissioned by Steve Baugh to induce Ralph Call, president of Pioneer, and
brother-in-law of Steve Baugh, to finance United West's purchase of the
properties" (see fact paragraph 6.c. hereinabove), was nearly a verbatim quote of
paragraph 3 of the Budd Defendants' memorandum filed in support of their
summary judgment cross-motion in which the Budd Defendants further argued
that Steve Baugh was an agent of Ralph Call, the principal of Pioneer. (R. 3677.)
In Pioneer's memorandum opposing the Budd Defendants' cross-motion,
however, responding to the Budd Defendants' paragraph 3 and agency claim in the
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Budd Defendants' paragraph 24, Pioneer expressly stated, among other things (R.
4206):
Pioneer disputes and denies that Steve Baugh ("Baugh") was or has
ever been its agent, or Ralph Call's agent, for or relating in any way to
any of the transactions that are the subject of this case. The sworn Call
Affidavit being filed with the Court and the sworn Affidavit of Steve
Baugh (the "Baugh Affidavit") also being filed with the Court, both
clearly and emphatically state and confirm that Baugh has never been
hired nor otherwise authorized to act as any agent or other representative
of Pioneer in any way or capacity, including not relating or pertaining in
any way to any of the Pioneer loans that are the subject of this case.
(Call Affidavit, 1 3 , Addendum 15; Baugh Affidavit, ^ 3, Addendum 16).

Pioneer also disputes and denies that the appraisal referenced in
Budd Parties' Claimed Factfflf3 and 24 was commissioned to induce
Pioneer to make any loans, and further disputes and denies that Ralph
Call read the appraisal report before Pioneer made its loans that are the
subject of this case. The Call and Baugh affidavits being filed herewith
both directly state and confirm that Pioneer did not commission, request,
authorize, or even know about the appraisal report being ordered or
commissioned by Baugh. (Call Affidavit, ^f 6, Addendum 15; Baugh
Affidavitfflf4-6, Addendum 16).
The Anderson Defendants also claimed in fact paragraphs 6 and 8 of their
summary judgment memorandum that Baugh was an agent of Pioneer with
authority to act for Pioneer. (R. 3639.) Pioneer also expressly disputed and
denied that claimed agency in its response to paragraphs 6 and 8 in its
memorandum opposing the Anderson Defendants' summary judgment crossmotion precisely the same as set forth in the first block-quoted paragraph above.
(R.4180).
b.

The District Court's references to the purported facts as to any actual

notice based upon an appraisal report (fact paragraph 6.c. above) before Pioneer's
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first loan in November 2000, were drawn from paragraphs 3 and 24 of the Budd
Defendants' memorandum filed in support of their summary judgment crossmotion, and paragraph 7 of the Anderson Defendants' memorandum filed in
support of their summary judgment cross-motion, which memoranda appear at R.
3677 and R. 3639, respectively. In Pioneer's memoranda opposing those crossmotions (R. 4206 and 4180), however, responding to the Budd Defendants'
paragraphs 3 and 24 and the Anderson Defendants' paragraph 7, Pioneer expressly
disputed those claimed facts as follows:
Pioneer further disputes and denies ... that Pioneer's president, Call,
read the referenced appraisal before Pioneer making any loans. Indeed,
the body of the appraisal itself is dated December 29, 2000, more than a
month after Pioneer's first loan was made. Moreover, when Baugh
received the appraisal, sometime after December 29, 2000, he forwarded
to Call only two pages of it without all of the lease information and
other detail the Budd Parties refer to and rely upon in their claimed fact
fflf 3 and 24. (Call Affidavit, ^ 6, Addendum 15; Baugh Affidavit,fflf48, Addendum 16).
Pioneer disputes and denies Budd Parties' Claimed Fact ^ 3 and 24
that Pioneer had actual notice of existing leasehold interests and current
sales prior to making any loans on the property, including since that
claim actually is a conclusion drawn by the Budd Parties from its other
fact claims set forth in itsfflj3 and 24, all of which as shown above are
disputed by Pioneer.
(Emphasis added).
c.

In the very same Initial Decision in which the District Court stated

that "[i]n approximately April of 2001, Ralph Call and Steve Baugh personally
visited the property, giving Pioneer actual knowledge of the Defendants' uses and
improvements of the property to the extent these were visible" (see fact paragraph
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6.e. above), the District Court itself acknowledged that "Plaintiff disputes that it
had inquiry notice of the existence of the purported improvements and disputes
any actual knowledge of these claimed improvements." (R. 4381) (emphasis
added). It nevertheless still entered summary judgment for Filing Defendants
based on inquiry notice despite those acknowledged disputes of material facts.
Those purported actual knowledge facts mentioned by the District Court were
drawn from paragraph 10 of the Budd Defendants' memorandum filed in support
oftheir summary judgment cross-motion. (R. 3677). In Pioneer's memorandum
opposing the Budd Defendants' cross-motion, however, responding to the Budd
Defendants' paragraph 10, Pioneer expressly stated, among other things, that
Pioneer disputes the purported agencies (including without limitation as noted
above), and (R. 4206):
... Pioneer disputes the portions of Budd Parties' Claimed Fact f 10
claiming Pioneer somehow had "actual knowledge of Defendant
Taylors' use and improvement of parcel -025, and ongoing sales of RV
sites on parcel -025 to new defendants" based upon that visit to the
subject property, as claimed by the Budd Parties. As stated in Call's
sworn affidavit, all he saw with regard to any use or improvements on
any of the subject property was "[a]t most there were four or five
recreational vehicle camper trailers parked in various spots [,] a few
concrete slabs in scattered places[,] a lodge on the property, and some
small, narrow roads." (Call Affidavit, ^ 8, Addendum 15).
(Emphasis added).

Other Relevant Facts and Documents
8.

The District Court held "Plaintiff obtained its trust deed interests in the

Property subject to the restrictions appearing in the owners' warranty deed restrictions,
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including making the interests 'subject to all... easements, agreements, memberships,
[and] leases.'" (January 2009 Judgment and Order, If 13.d. (R. 5422) included in
Addendum 4.)
9.

The actual "subject to" clause language in each of the deeds to the grantors

of Pioneer's Trust Deeds was:
Subject to all declarations, covenants, conditions and restrictions,
certificate of beneficial use, regulations, canals, greenbelt provisions,
easements, declarations, agreements, memberships, leases and rights of
way of record.
(Certified copies of the deeds to the grantors of Pioneer's Trust Deeds were attached to
Pioneer's Summary Judgment Memo and Pioneer's Reply Memo as exhibits (at R. 30163016 and R. 4178-4179), copies of which are attached hereto as Addenda 10 and 11,
respectively (emphasis added).
10.

The deed to the entity that became trustor of Pioneer's First Trust Deed

conveyed to that grantor all three of the parcels which were then described in Pioneer's
First Trust Deed (specifically, Rich County tax ID numbers 41-08-00-036, 41-08-00-037
and 41 -08-00-03 8). (Addendum 5 hereto.)
11.

As it was recorded, the deed to the entity that then became trustor of

Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, appeared to
describe on its face only three of the four parcels that entity then described and pledged in
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed. Specifically, the
deed to the entity that then became trustor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and
Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, as recorded, described and included Rich County tax
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ID numbers 41-08-00-0365 41-08-00-037 and 41-08-00-038, but did not, as recorded,
expressly identify Parcel -025 that was also included with those three parcels in Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed. {Compare Addendum 11
with Addenda 6 and 7.)
12.

There was recorded in the office of the Rich County Recorder on

September 24, 2002, by an employee of Advanced Title who handled the closing on the
transaction involving the conveyance to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed
and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust deed and its granting of those trust deeds, an "Affidavit
Concerning Recorded Instruments" (the "Corrective Affidavit") which expressly states

,

that Parcel -025 "was included in the transaction between the parties ... and should have
been included in the legal description attached to" the deed to the grantor of Modified
Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed attaching legal description pages.
{See Initial Decision, ^f 39 (R. 4377, Addendum 1) A certified copy of the Corrective
Affidavit was attached as an exhibit to Pioneer's summary judgment reply memo at R.

<

4172, and a copy of it is attached as Addendum 12 hereto.)
13.

As the Budd Defendants themselves pointed out, and the District Court

ruled, the Purchase and Sale Agreement between the prior owner of the Property (an
entity referred to in the District Court as KDA) and the party to whom it sold the
Property, to whom Pioneer made some of its loans and who signed Pioneer's Modified
Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed (an entity referred to in the District
Court as Pine Ridge), expressly listed Parcel -025 as among the parcels that KDA agreed
to convey and Pine Ridge agreed and contracted to buy. (Initial Decision, ^ 23 (R. 4373,
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Addendum 1); see also exhibit 7 to Budd Defendants' initial summary judgment
memorandum beginning at R. 3677).
14.

Nevertheless, the District Court ruled the Corrective Affidavit "is a nullity,

is not retroactive, and does not meet the requirements of § 57-3-106(8) UCA." (January
2009 Judgment and Order, ^ 13.e., at R. 5422, included in Addendum 4 hereto).
15.

The District Court stated that, prior to the recording of the Corrective

Affidavit, "Plaintiff failed to record parcel -025 in its Modified Pioneer Trust Deed filing.
After the failure to include parcel -025, improvements were made to lots in parcel -025
between the time the leaseholds were purchased (which were after the Modified Pioneer
Trust Deed was recorded and the time of the correction filing," and "Plaintiffs Modified
Pioneer Trust Deed filing and corrective filing fails to put Plaintiff in a superior position
to [Filing] Defendants." (Initial Decision, at R. 4384-4385, Addendum 1 hereto).
16.

The District Court itself, however, had already acknowledged earlier in its

Initial Decision (and it later confirmed in its January 2009 Judgment and Order), that
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed expressly does include, identify, and list Parcel -025
among the Property affected by it. (Initial Decision, ^ 33.a., at R. 4375 - 4376,
Addendum 1 hereto; January 2009 Judgment and Order,fflj2 & 3, at R. 5417-5418,
included in Addendum 4 hereto; see also Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed, Addendum 6
hereto).
17.

Additionally, the District Court also recognized that Pioneer's

Supplemental Trust Deed that was recorded the same day as Prioneer's Modified Trust
Deed in any event also expressly included, identified, and listed Parcel -025 among the
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Property affected by it. (Initial Decision, % 33.a., at R. 4375 - 4376; January 2009
Judgment and Order,ffif2-4, at R. 5417-5418, included in Addendum 4 hereto; Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed, Addendum 6 hereto).
18.

It is undisputed that, as a part of a settlement of part of this case, an

additional deed was executed to confirm and unequivocally convey the Property,
including Parcel -025, to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's
Supplemental Trust Deed (the "Settlement Deed"). A certified copy of that Settlement
Deed was attached to Pioneer's summary judgment reply memo as an exhibit at R. 41744176, and a copy of it is included as Addendum 13 hereto.
19.

The January 2009 Judgment and Order expressly left open the priority

determination as to some of the Filing Defendants who claimed interests in certain lots
identified in the District Court proceedings, and in this brief, as the Payment Lots.
(January 2009 Judgment and Order, f 21 at R. 5427, attached as a part of Addendum 4
hereto).
20.

The documents under which the claimants to the Payment Lots contracted

for their respective interests in those lots each indisputably stated that those parties "shall
receive a certificate of ownership when contract is paid in full." (August 2010 Judgment
on Payment Lots, ^ 3 at R. 5440 included in Addendum 4 hereto; see also e.g., p. ix (at R.
5140) ofMemorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Judgment of Priority Over
Certain uPayment Lots " Pursuant to the Court's January 2009 Judgment and Order).
21.

Each of the claimants to each of the Payment Lots indisputably admitted in

sworn deposition testimony that their respective contracts had not been paid in full.
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(August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots, <[| 4 at R. 5440 included in Addendum 4 hereto;
see also e.g., id. at pp. viii-ix (at R. 5139 - 5140)).
22.

Citing back to and relying upon the inquiry notice analysis of its January

2009 Judgment and Order, however, the District Court ultimately held the interest of the
claimants to the Payment Lots "were prior in right to any interest or claim of Plaintiff
because Plaintiff did not purport to obtain title to what has been referred to herein as
Parcel -025 until [the Corrective Affidavit] on September 24, 2002." (August 2010
Judgment on Payment Lots, at R. 5441 included in Addendum 4 hereto).
23.

The Anderson Defendants and the Budd Defendants each referred in their

summary judgment memoranda, as a part of their inquiry notice argument, to the
existence of title insurance held by Pioneer. For example, the Anderson Defendants
argued that Pioneer was had constructive notice of recorded leases "reflected in a title
commitment and policy" (at R. 3650), and the Budd Defendants argued Pioneer's
"recourse lies in an action against the trustor personally, and with the title company who
insured the property." (at R. 3695).
24.

Pioneer objected to and moved to strike the references to title insurance

(e.g., at R. 4709 & R. 4201), to no avail.
Attorney Fees
25.

The promissory notes for which Pioneer's Trust Deeds were granted as

security each expressly provided that the obligors were obligated to pay and Pioneer is
entitled to recover (including through foreclosure as against the Property) all costs and
expenses of collection, including without limitation reasonable attorney fees. (See e.g.,
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R. 2985 Affidavit of Ralph Call,fflf3 & 4 and its Exhibits "A" and "B", R. 2989 and R.
2991, copies of all of which are attached hereto as a part of Addendum 14; see also e.g.,
R. 2965, f 16 of Pioneer's Summary Judgment Memo, undisputed in pointing out
Pioneer's entitlement under its promissory notes to recover all costs and expenses of
collection, including attorney fees).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion sought simply to foreclose on real property
based upon the indisputable record priority of Pioneer's Trust Deeds as against the later
(and in some cases never) recorded interests of defendants in various parts of the
Property. There were no disputes as to any material facts on Pioneer's Summary
Judgment Motion. Indeed, the Filing Defendants admitted the relevant and dispositive
facts of this case: that Pioneer's Trust Deeds securing its loans were recorded on the
Property before any of the Filing Defendants recorded any documents relating to any of
their claimed interests. Since they indisputably were recorded first, pursuant to Utah's
recording statute Pioneer's Trust Deeds are prior and superior as a matter of law to any
interests claimed by Filing Defendants in any of the Property.
The District Court, however, erroneously applied an "inquiry notice" analysis to
this case. Record notice pursuant to Utah's recording statute is the default rule for
ranking priority of interests in real property, including because it is objection and easily
verifiable. Inquiry notice is a rare exception to record notice. It is well-settled that facts
and circumstances that are not inconsistent with or adverse to what appears in the
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documents of record do not give rise to any duty to inquire beyond the face of the county
recorder's records nor otherwise upset the default rule of record notice priority. None of
the factors claimed by Filing Defendants and relied upon by the District Court in support
of the inquiry notice analysis were inconsistent with what one would expect to see with
regard to property like that at issue in this case. As a matter of law, therefore, those
factors cannot give rise to any duty to inquire beyond the record looking for interests of
parties who failed to record. The District Court therefore erred in concluding otherwise,
and applying inquiry notice to the case at bar. The District Court's inquiry notice ruling
is unsupported by, and indeed contrary to, applicable inquiry notice case law. If upheld
on the claimed facts of this case, the District Court's ruling imposing a duty to inquire
beyond the recorded documents would have a profoundly negative and destabilizing
impact on the real property secured lending industry. This Court should reverse the
District Court's application of inquiry notice to this case as a matter of law.
The District Court further erred in any event by granting Filing Defendants'
Summary Judgment Cross-Motions imposing inquiry notice because there were disputes
of facts claimed by Defendants and relied upon by the District Court in support of and
material to the inquiry notice analysis. The existence of disputes of fact precluded any
grant of Defendants' Summary Judgment Cross-Motions finding or imposing any duty of
Pioneer to inquire beyond the records of the Rich County Recorder's Office, and further
compel a reversal of the District Court's rulings applying inquiry notice.
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The District Court also erred in other portions of its inquiry notice analysis,
including in its interpretation of the language in and other content and effect of various
recorded documents and statutes.
This Court should follow and apply Utah's recording statute, reverse the District
Court's erroneous and improper application of inquiry notice to this case, and rule that
Pioneer's Trust Deeds are prior and superior, as a matter of law, to the interests of all
other parties to this case.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING INQUIRY NOTICE AS
GOVERNING PRIORITY IN THIS CASE, RATHER THAN RECORD
NOTICE PURSUANT TO UTAH'S RECORDING STATUTE
This Court should reverse the District Court's erroneous application of inquiry

notice to this case. Even if they were undisputed (which they were not, as discussed in
Argument II below), the facts relied upon by the District Court were insufficient as a
matter of law to impose any duty to make any inquiry in addition to or beyond the
documents recorded in the Rich County Recorder's Office.
For determining the priority of interests in real property, the Utah Legislature has
enacted a recording statute which, as a matter of law, codifies the rule of "first in time,
first in right." Pursuant to Utah's recording statute, priority is determined according to
the order in which competing interests were recorded, with the first-recorded interest
having priority. E.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102(1) & -103(2) (2005) (providing that
immediately from the time of recording of a document in the county recorder's office
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such document provides notice of its contents to all persons, and that priority among
interests in real property is determined by the order of recording); Wilson v. Schne iter's
Riverside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1974).
This Court has long recognized "[t]he salutariness of [Utah's] recording statute is
that it provides stability and certainty to land titles" upon which parties must be able to
rely. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1988). Since
Pioneer's Trust Deeds admittedly and indisputably were recorded before any of the Filing
Defendants recorded any documents evidencing any claim or interest by any of them in
the Property, as a matter of law pursuant to Utah's recording statute Pioneer's Trust
Deeds are superior to the interests of each and all of the Defendants.
The District Court, however, departed from the record notice priority system
established by Utah's recording statute, and held that Pioneer had "inquiry notice" of the
Defendants' various claimed, but admittedly unrecorded, interests in various portions of
the Property, and that Pioneer's Trust Deeds were junior and subordinate in priority to
some (but not all) of the Filing Defendants'interests.
The doctrine of inquiry notice has been recognized in Utah case law. It is,
however, a rare exception to the general rule of record notice under Utah's recording
statute. This Court has held that a duty to inquire beyond the records of the county
recorder's office arises only "when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable
person on notice so as to require further inquiry on his part." Id. at 838. It is well-settled
that facts and circumstances that are not inconsistent with or adverse to what appears in
the documents of record do not put one on notice of any need to inquire further, and do
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not give rise to or create any duty to inquire beyond the face of the record. See e.g., Patel
v. Rupp, 195 B.R. 779, 783-84 (D. Utah 1996) (finding no inquiry notice of unrecorded
interest where use of the property was not inconsistent with or adverse to recorded
interest); In re Granada, Inc., 92 B.R. 501, 506 (D. Utah 1988) (rejecting argument of
claimed duty to inquire beyond the record title where use of property was not inconsistent
*•

with what one would expect to see); see also generally PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND
TITLES § 12 (3d ed 2005) ("for possession to afford notice of an unrecorded interest,
enough inconsistency must exist between the possession and the record to raise a
question in the mind of anyone having a transaction with the holder of the record title.'9).

,

A use of property that is expected or consistent with what one would expect to find on a
given parcel as a matter of law defeats any inquiry notice argument. See e.g., Stumph v.
I

Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1987) (finding lender had no duty to inquire beyond
the record title as to identity of owner prior to closing of non-owner occupied loan; fact
that occupants of home at time of inspection were not the record owners was consistent

'

with what was expected).
None of the facts noted by the District Court were out of the ordinary with respect
i

to a subdivision style property like the RV park Property in this case, nor would they
arouse any suspicion of any reasonable person to inquire beyond the recorded documents
to search out any hypothetically possible claimants with unrecorded interests. The
District Court noted, for example, that the Property had been drawn out essentially as a
subdivision of numerous RV pads and campsites and a plat of them had been recorded,

<

there were Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of a members' association recorded, and
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there were various leasehold claims and related interests of various people also recorded
in the Rich County Recorder's Office. It also held (based on disputed facts, which is the
subject of Argument II below) that some people had made certain use of and
improvements to their respective RV pad sites within the Property before various of
Pioneer's Trust Deeds were recorded. The District Court held those claimed facts gave
rise to a legal duty of lenders like Pioneer to inquire further than the documents of record
in the county recorder's office to determine who else may own or claim any unrecorded
interests in the subject property.
The District Court's ruling that documents recorded to dedicate the Property as an
RV park, the recorded plat of the RV park, and various recorded leases on various of the
RV sites (none of which are the Filing Defendants' leases on their claimed RV sites)
somehow give rise to a legal duty of lenders like Pioneer to inquire further than and
outside the documents of record to determine who else may own or claim any interests in
the other RV parks or lots within the Property development not reflected in the recorded
documents is illogical and unsustainable. It would turn the real estate secured lending
industry on its head. Such items are not inconsistent with what one would expect to see
in regard to property like that at issue in this case. To the contrary, the facts showed
exactly what one would expect to see with respect to any similar subdivision - a general
development, various lots (RV sites) with respect to which lessees had recorded their
claims and interests, and other lots (RV sites) that appeared of record not to have yet been
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leased. The existence of prior recorded leases on some RV sites, however, does not give
notice of or signal the existence of unrecorded leases on other sites, as Defendants'
argument claims. Even the claimed use or occupancy, and the claimed existence of
certain improvements, on various lots and not on others, is precisely what one would
expect to see with respect to any similar subdivision development, and is consistent with
the record which included recorded leasehold interests on some RV sites, but not others.
The facts and circumstances of this case simply, and as a matter of law, do not give rise
to any duty to inquire beyond the records of the Rich County Recorder's Office.
This case is the first of which the undersigned is aware to come before Utah's
appellate courts addressing the applicability of the inquiry notice doctrine in favor of
claimants to individual pads, lots, or units within a larger subdivided development tract,
as against the beneficiary of a blanket trust deed upon the entire development tract. The
case of In re Granada, Inc., 92 B.R. 501 (D. Utah 1988) is highly instructive to this case.
In Granada, the bankruptcy court dealt with an inquiry notice claim under Utah law. The
property at issue in Granada was a mobile home park, very similar to the property at
issue in this case which is an RV park. Like the Defendants in the case at bar, the party
claiming inquiry notice in Granada argued that portions of the property there at issue had
been leased to tenants, who were in open occupancy and possession of their leased
parcels. The party claiming inquiry notice in that case argued "where property is in the
2

Significantly, as the District Court itself noted "[s]everal leasehold interests (virtually
identical interests to those of the other [defendants], except on different Lots) were
recorded prior to the recording of the Pioneer trust deeds. (Initial Decision, at f 4 (R.
4369), included in Addendum 1 hereto.) The owners of those leases recorded prior to the
Pioneer Trust Deed are not named as Defendants."
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possession of tenants, a purchaser must inquire about the identity of the landlord." Id. at
506. Noting that "there is nothing that an inspection would have produced which was
inconsistent with record title," the Granada Court firmly rejected that argument. Id. In
language directly applicable to the case at bar, that court explained:
we are unable to conclude that in 1988 tenants in possession of a mobile
home park developed for that express purpose is sufficiently alarming so as
to put a purchaser on constructive inquiry notice. [Id.].
Likewise, applied to the case at bar, occupancy and possession by various lessees
of an RV park developed for that express purpose simply is not sufficiently alarming so
as to put Pioneer on constructive inquiry notice to inquire beyond the record for holders
of unrecorded interests. Accordingly, even if the facts noted by the District Court were1
undisputed, they would prove only use of the subject property as a recreational vehicle
park, which is precisely what the subject Property was being developed to be. As a
matter of law, therefore, such facts simply did not give rise to any duty to inquire about
unrecorded interests in the property and the District Court may not impose any duty to
inquire beyond the record for, nor any purported "inquiry notice" of, any of the Filing
Defendants' unrecorded claims to any of the Property. The District Court erred in ruling
Pioneer was subject to inquiry notice.
If the District Court's ruling in this case were the law, then there would never be
any way that any lender could ever be assured regarding the priority of any lien,
particularly on development or subdivision property like is at issue in this case. Any
recording or use by any person on any part of a tract of property, under the District
Court's ruling, would require lenders to conduct unspecified inquiries beyond, and indeed
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despite the record title as to every conceivable claimant to every separate part, parcel, and
portion of the overall development property to be used as security for a loan. Even then a
lender still could not be certain some other unidentified claimant of some unrecorded
interest was not still out there.
The District Court's inquiry notice ruling would provide an exception to the
recording statute that would swallow the rule of statutory record notice priority. It would
allow parties to ignore the recording statute entirely, and shift the burden to lenders to
protect them by requiring lenders to somehow divine the possible existence of those
parties' non-record interests, at the lender's substantial peril, even where there is nothing
out of the ordinary to signal the presence of any unrecorded interest. It is precisely the
quagmire such a rule would create that the recording statute is designed to avoid.
i

Recording in compliance with Utah's statutes creates an objective and verifiable means
of perfecting and searching for claims and interests in real property upon which to base
informed and prudent lending and other decisions. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B.

*

Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1988) (recognizing "[t]he salutariness of [Utah's]
recording statute is that is provides stability and certainty to land titles.") This Court
therefore should reverse the District Court's inquiry notice rulings and apply the rule of
statutory record notice priority to all parties' claims and interests in this case and declare,
as a matter of law, that Pioneer's Trust Deeds are ahead of and superior to the claimed
interests of all of the Defendants in this case that indisputably were recorded (if ever)
after Pioneer's Trust Deeds.
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II.

DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT FURTHER PRECLUDED THE
DISTRICT COURT FROM GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEFENDANTS' INQUIRY NOTICE THEORY
The District Court further erred in application of inquiry notice on summary

judgment because there were disputes of material facts claimed by Defendants and relied
upon by the District Court in support of imposing the duty of inquiry notice.
It is well-settled that summary judgment can be granted only if "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P. "[A] motion for summary judgment should be
denied where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact." Jackson v. Dabney,
645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). It is well-settled that "'[o]ne sworn statement under oath
[involving a material fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby
precluding summary judgment.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)) (alteration in original). In proceedings on a motion for summary judgment, all
facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
E.g., Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). Also, all facts
asserted in opposition to the Filing Defendants' Cross-Motion must be taken as
established for the purposes of these proceedings. E.g., Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d
1332, 1334-35 (Utah 1977).

These disputes of fact do not affect Pioneer's entitlement to judgment of priority as a
matter of law, however, since Pioneer's priority is based on a faithful adherence to the
long-settled statutory recording system and the indisputable record notice priority of
Pioneer's Trust Deeds.
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A major part of the Filing Defendants' inquiry notice argument and the District
Court's inquiry notice analysis related to various claimed uses of and improvements
purportedly made to various of the Filing Defendants'RV sites.
The District Court held that several Filing Defendants have on various RV sites
made or installed storage sheds,firepits, rock walls, stairs, fences, landscaping, lawns,
flowers, trees, gardens, family signs, patio furniture, sprinklers, water hookups, utility
meters, cement pads, gravel driveways, and parked RVs. Filing Defendants argued and
the District Court ruled that Ralph Call, president of Pioneer, had actual knowledge of
those claimed improvements to numerous lots from a visit he made to the Property in
April of 2001. That purported actual knowledge is material and necessary to the District
Court's inquiry notice ruling, because as a matter of law a duty to inquire further from
facts outside of recorded documents can arise only if the party has actual knowledge of
the non-record facts. See e.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834,
837-839 (Utah 1998). Pioneer, however, disputed the existence of the purported
improvements claimed by the Filings Defendants, and disputed any actual knowledge of
Ralph Call relating to such claimed improvements. Rather than all of the improvements
claimed by the Filing Defendants, and noted by the District Court, when Ralph Call
visited the site in April 2001 he stated in his sworn affidavit that "[a]t most there were
four orfiverecreational vehicle camper trailers parked in various spots [,] a few concrete
slabs in scattered places[,] a lodge on the property, and some small, narrow roads." (Call
Affidavit, Tf 8 (R. 4250, Addendum 15 hereto.) The District Court itself expressly
acknowledged "Plaintiff disputes that it had inquiry notice of the existence of the
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purported improvements and disputed any actual knowledge of these claimed
improvements." (Initial Decision at R. 4381 (emphasis added), Addendum 1 hereto.) It
was inappropriate for the District Court to grant summary judgment for Defendants over
these disputed facts.
The District Court also relied heavily for its inquiry notice ruling on the claim that
Pioneer's principal, Ralph Call, had received and read a certain appraisal report
pertaining to the Property before Pioneer made any of its loans that are the subject of this
case. Since the full appraisal report allegedly included a lengthy and detailed discussion
of various claims and interests in the Property, the District Court reasoned that Pioneer
had actual knowledge of, and therefore a duty to inquire regarding, all unrecorded
interests in the property. Those claims are disputed even on the fact of the appraisal
report itself, and are further disputed by the sworn Call Affidavit and the sworn Baugh
Affidavit (Addenda 15 and 16, respectively). To begin with, on its face the appraisal is
dated December 29, 2000, more than a month after Pioneer's first loan was made.
Moreover, the sworn affidavits of Call and Baugh confirmed that when Baugh received
the appraisal, sometime after December 29, 2000, he forwarded to Call only two pages of
it, without all of the lease information and other detail the District Court relied upon in its
inquiry notice analysis. The claimed receipt and review of the referenced appraisal report
and related information therefore also are disputed material facts, which further precluded
summary judgment for the Filing Defendants.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO ERRED IN HANDLING THE
REMAINING ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

The Deeds to the Grantors of Pioneer's Trust Deeds Expressly Were
Subject to Only Certain Interests "Of Record."

As a part of its inquiry notice analysis, the District Court's January 2009 Judgment
and Order stated, "Plaintiff obtained its trust deed interests in the Property subject to the
restrictions appearing in the owners' warranty deed restrictions, including making the
interests "[s]ubject to a l l . . . easements, declarations, agreements, memberships [and]
leases

" fl[ 13.d. (R. 5422) (emphasis added).) The implication is that the District

Court imposed a duty to inquire beyond the record because Pioneer's own chain of title
was "subject to" various interests which could include, under that language, unrecorded
interests. The District Court's analysis, however, fails to take account of the full "subject
to" clause of those deeds. In their entirety, those clauses actually state that the
conveyances to Pioneer's Trust Deed grantors are:
Subject to all declarations, covenants, conditions and restrictions,
certificate of beneficial use, regulations, canals, greenbelt provisions,
easements, declarations, agreements, memberships, leases and rights of
way of record.
(R. 3016 and 4178, Addenda 10 and 11, respectively (emphasis added).
Since Defendants' claims and interests were not "of record" when the deeds to the
trustors of Pioneer's Trust Deeds were recorded, those deeds and Pioneer's Trust Deeds
are not subject to Defendants' non-record claims and interests.4 Deed references to what

4

In its Initial Decision, the District Court makes note of the full language of the "subject
to" clauses of the deeds. (Initial Decisionfflf14 and 24 at R. 4372-4374, Addendum 1.)
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is "of record" certainly do not give notice of, or require inquiry regarding, claims or
interests that are not "of record." Accordingly, nothing in the recorded deeds' language
supports imposition of a duty of inquiry outside of the record.
B. The District Court Erred in Its Handling of Parcel -025, Including
Regarding the Corrective Affidavit and After-Acquired Title.
The District Court failed to properly account in its inquiry notice analysis for the
legal effect of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed, Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, the
Corrective Affidavit, and the Settlement Deed. The District Court ruled that prior to the
recording of the Corrective Affidavit, "Plaintiff failed to record parcel -025 in its
Modified Pioneer Trust Deed filing. After the failure to include parcel -025,
improvements were made to lots in parcel -025 between the time the leaseholds were
purchased (which were after the Modified Pioneer Trust Deed was recorded and the time
of the correction filing," and Plaintiffs Modified Pioneer Trust Deed filing and
corrective filing fails to put Plaintiff in a superior position to [Filing] Defendants."
(Initial Decision, at R. 4384-4385, Addendum 1 hereto).
Those rulings, however, are erroneous, both factually and legally. Factually, as
the District Court itself actually had already acknowledged earlier in its Initial Decision
(and later confirmed in its January 2009 Judgment and Order), the face of Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed itself expressly does include, identify, and list Parcel -025 among
the Property affected by it. Moreover, the Court failed to even address in its analysis that
Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed in any event also indisputably expressly included,
But the District Court confused other language in the "subject to" clauses and never even
addressed the express and critical "of record" qualifier. Id.
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identified, and listed Parcel -025 among the Property affected by it, which the District
Court also acknowledged. (Initial Decision, ^ 33.a., at R. 4375 - 4376; Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed, Addendum 6 hereto). There were, therefore two of Pioneer's Trust
Deeds recorded on August 14, 2001, identifying and describing Parcel -025 as being
covered and encumbered by them.
Legally, the District Court erred in failing to recognize the record notice priority of
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed as to Parcel
-025 as of the date they were recorded, irrespective of any Corrective Affidavit. The
indisputable fact that both Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental
Trust Deed were recorded on August 14, 2001, each identifying and describing Parcel
-025 as among the Property encumbered by them means that the Filing Defendants, as a
matter of law pursuant to Utah's recording statute, were on constructive record notice of
Pioneer's claim to an interest in and encumbrance upon the Property, including Parcel
-025. The fact that the deed to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and
Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, as recorded, did not have Parcel -025 in its attached
legal description is of no moment. Pursuant to Utah's recording statute, once Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed were recorded with Parcel 025 included and described within them, as a matter of law they gave constructive notice
to all the world of their contents, including their containing a description of and their
claim of an interest in and encumbrance upon Parcel -025. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3102(1) (2005) ("Each document... shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate
county recorder, impact notice to all persons of their contents."). Accordingly, even if
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the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed did
not actually own Parcel -025 when it signed those trust deeds, the recording of those trust
deeds still, as a matter of law, put Filing Defendants and all the world on notice of
Pioneer's claim to an interest in Parcel -025. The Corrective Affidavit expressly
remedied any oversight or clerical error in the mistaken exclusion of Parcel -025 from the
legal description page attached to and recorded with the deed to the grantor of Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed.5 Even without that,
however, Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed
themselves, as a matter of record and of law, placed the world on notice of Pioneer's
claim to and encumbrance upon Parcel-025.
In any event, the Settlement Deed definitively and indisputably rendered Parcel

5

The District Court erred in ruling the Corrective Affidavit "is a nullity, is not
retroactive, and does not meet the requirements of § 57-3-106(8) UCA." (January 2009
Judgment and Order, % 13.e., at R.5422, included in Addendum No. 4). The Corrective
Affidavit expressly states that Parcel -025 "was included in the transaction between the
parties ... and should have been included in the legal description attached to" the deed to
Pine Ridge. (Addendum No. 12). Even the Budd Parties themselves pointed out, and the
District Court itself ruled, the relevant Purchase and Sale Agreement shows that Parcel
-025 was indeed intended to be conveyed to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed
and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed. Corrections by affidavit of such clerical errors
as the mistaken attachment of the wrong legal description attachment to a document are
expressly allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-106(8) (2006) ("Minor typographical or
clerical errors in a document of record may be corrected by the recording of an affidavit
or other appropriate instrument.") (emphasis added). Given the above facts with regard
to the intended inclusion of Parcel -025 in the deed to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified
and Supplemental Trust Deeds, as a matter of law, the Corrective Affidavit fixed the
clerical error by which the legal description of Parcel -025 was mistakenly not attached to
the conveyance deed, correcting and confirming as a matter of record and of law that
Parcel -025 was indeed conveyed.
4850-4696-9353
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-025 validly and effectively covered and encumbered by Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed
and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, as if Parcel -025 was vested of record in the
grantor at the time it executed those trust deeds. The Settlement Deed that was recorded
on March 14, 2005 (Addendum 13). Pursuant to the after-acquired title doctrine, which
has been statutorily codified in Utah, that conveyance automatically and as a matter of
law is deemed effective to include Parcel -025 "as security for the obligation or
obligations for which [Parcel -025] is conveyed as if acquired before execution of the
trust deed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-20 (2006) (emphasis added). As a matter of
statutory law, therefore, even if the grantor did not own Parcel -025 when it signed
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed that each
included Parcel -025 in their legal descriptions of the property encumbered by those trust
deeds, by virtue of the later and admitted Settlement Deed conveyance of Parcel -025 to
that grantor, those Pioneer trust deeds indisputably attached to and encumbered Parcel 025, as a matter of law, retroactive to the date they were recorded "as i f Parcel -025 was
acquired and owned by that grantor at the time it executed those trust deeds. Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, both recorded on August
14, 2001, are both prior and superior to all of the Filing Defendants' interests since they
indisputably were not recorded until after Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's
Supplemental Trust Deed, if at all. The District Court, however, failed to take any
account at all of the Settlement Deed.
The District Court failed to properly construe and account for the Pioneer's
Modified Trust Deed, Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, the Corrective Affidavit, the
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Settlement Deed, and each of the statutes discussed above in this section. Each of those
failures contributed to the ultimate erroneous ruling imposing a duty of inquiry beyond
the record and granting inquiry notice priority for the Filing Defendants. This Court
should reverse the District Court on each of these above-noted points, and reverse the
District Court's resulting erroneous ruling as to the priority of Filing Defendants'
interests.
C.

The District Court Erred in Granting Priority to Claimants in the
Payment Lots Contrary to Their Governing Contract Language and
Sworn Admissions.

The claimants to the Payment Lots each admitted under oath in their sworn
deposition testimony that they have not paid in fall their respective contracts to obtain
their respective claimed interests in the various Payment Lots. Accordingly, pursuant to
the express language of their own contracts clearly, expressly, and indisputably stating
they shall receive their interests in those lots only "when contract is paid in fall," the
claimants to the Payment Lots are not yet even entitled to receive any ownership or other
interest in any of the Payments Lots. Moreover, even if and when those claimants ever
do pay off their contracts, any interests they may obtain under those contracts always was
and will always be and remain junior and inferior in priority to, and subject to the Pioneer
Trust Deeds in any event because the Pioneer's Trust Deeds all are already recorded and
encumber whatever interest may ultimately eventually be granted to those claimants.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1) (2009) ("Each document... shall, from the time of
recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their
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contents"); id. § 57-3-103(2) (assigning priority among competing property claims to that
which is evidenced by the "document [that] is first duly recorded").
As a matter of law, Pioneer's recorded Trust Deeds are prior and superior to any
interest of the claimants to the Payment Lots who have never paid those contracts to
actually become entitled receive or obtain any interest in those lots, and who had not
recorded any document pertaining to their claimed interests in the Payment Lots before
the recording of Pioneer's Trust Deeds. This Court should therefore reverse the District
Court's August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots and declare the Pioneer Trust Deeds
prior and superior as a matter of law to the claimed interests of the claimants to those lots,
and allow Pioneer to complete the foreclosure of the Pioneer Trust Deeds including as
against the Payment Lots.
D.

Filing Defendants' References to Insurance Were Impermissible,
Prejudicial and Support Reversal.

The Filing Defendants' references to the possible availability of title insurance for
Pioneer is unavailing to them on their inquiry notice theories, and was prejudicial to
Pioneer and is therefore a further basis for reversal of the District Court's ruling. The
Anderson Defendants mentioned the availability of a title policy, and the Budd
Defendants expressly argued that Pioneer's recourse in this case would be a claim on that
policy to the company who insured the Property.
The collateral source rule bars courts from considering the existence of possible
payments to a party from external sources, like insurance, in analyzing and evaluating the
parties' rights and the merits of claims in a case. See e.g., Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U.S.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Fidelity & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 345 (Utah 1997). Whether or not any Pioneer title
insurance policy ultimately might cover any losses that might be suffered by Pioneer
were not able to foreclose as against the Filing Defendants based on the record notice
priority of Pioneer's Trust Deeds, is speculative and in any event is irrelevant and
immaterial to determining the respective rights and priorities between Pioneer and the
Filing Defendants. Pioneer maintains the insurance references and arguments account for
the District Court's erratic and inconsistent self reversals in applying record notice at
various times and inquiry notice at other times as it attempted to craft an outcome, taking
into account potential insurance coverage against some of its rulings. The Filing
Defendants' arguments and evidence of possible title insurance coverage, however, were
improper and inadmissible in this case, including in the summary judgment proceedings.
See e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Utah R. Evid. 401, 402, & 403. Pioneer's objections to
and motion to strike the references to title insurance issued to Pioneer went unheeded.
Those insurance references and arguments by the Filing Defendants were prejudicial and
support reversal of the District Court's rulings in favor of the Filing Defendants.

IV.

PIONEER SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED
ON APPEAL
Pioneer is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. The

promissory notes for which Pioneer's Trust Deeds serve as security each provide that
Pioneer is entitled to recover all costs and expenses of collection, including reasonable
attorney fees. This Court, therefore, should award to Pioneer its attorney fees incurred on
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appeal, including as a part of the amount for which it may foreclose Pioneer's Trust
Deeds as against each and all of the defendants herein.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the District court's rulings applying the inquiry notice
theory of priority instead of the rule of statutory record notice priority that should govern
this case. The District Court's decision granting priority to the interests of Defendants on
summary judgment based on inquiry notice was unsustainable on the facts of this case,
and particularly on summary judgment in light of disputes of facts material to the inquiry
notice theory.
By contrast, Pioneer's Trust Deeds indisputably were recorded prior to any
interests of any of the Defendants to any part of the subject Property. As a matter of
express statutory law, therefore, pursuant to Utah's recording statutes Pioneer's Trust
Deeds are superior to the interests of all Defendants.. This Court should therefore reverse
the District Court, apply record notice priority to all Defendants, and allow Pioneer to
foreclose its Trust Deeds as prior and superior to all interests of all Defendants in and to
any and all parts of and interests in the Property.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of May, 2011.

FABIAN & CLEM)ENIN, PC
Attorneys for Inaintiff/Appellant Pioneer
Builders Company of Nevada, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT PIONEER BUILDERS COMPANY OF NEVADA, INC., together
with the separately-bound Addenda, were mailed by first-class mail with postage fully
prepaid this 26th day of May, 2011, to each of the following:
Gary N. Anderson
Brian G. Cannell
HILL YARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C.
595 South Riverwoods Parkway, Suite 100
Logan, Utah 84321
Attorneys for Plaintiff
N. George Daines
Jonathan E. Jenkins
DAINES &WYATT
108 North Main Street
Logan, UT 84321
Attorneys for KDA Corporation
Mark J. Williams

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Steven G. Baugh, RE/MAXin the Valley,
and RE/MAX West
D. Jason Hawkins
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 4500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
A ttorneys for Advanced Title Insurance Agency, L. C.
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Stuart H. Schultz, Esq.
Byron G. Martin
STRONG &HANNI
3 Triad Center #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Attorneys for Thor B. Roundy, P.C. and Thor Roundy

Brent K. Wamsley
Wamsley & Associates, L.C.
4360 South Redwood Road, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123-2204
Attorneys for Boyd Smith and Carolyn Smith
Miles P. Jensen
Olson & Hoggan, P.C.
130 South Main, Suite 200
PO Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Attorneys for Lynn C Andersen, Larry H. Anderson, Bill
Breinholt, Shawna Breinholt, Donna L. Elmquist, William R.
Glaser, Laurie A. Glaser, Lenard Hanzlick, KathrynJ. Hanzlick,
Harold J. Kay, Glade Larsen, Coralie Larsen, Gregory Larsen,
Jerilyn Larsen, Nictree Limited Partnership, Richard Roberts,
Carol Roberts, Marcel J. Schwager, Sandra S. Schwager, John
D. Smidt as Trustee, Linda L. Smidt as Trustee, Dorothy
Steadman, Sunrise Village Members' Association, Inc., Clint
Thompson, Carolyn Thompson, Dale Ridd, Marta Ridd, Timothy
J. Kendell, and Scott Hayes
Joseph M. Chambers
Josh Chambers
Harris, Preston & Chambers, PC
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Attorneys for ShyrealD. Jensen and Inge L. Jensen, and Harlan
and Renae Taylor
Larry and Karen Call
726 W. 3500 N.
Ogden,UT 84414
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Ronald Hunter, Kay Hunter
Daniel Hunter and Randall Hunter
8723 Oakwood Park Circle
Sandy, UT 84094
Brent and Ginger Rhees
3772 N. 3900 W.
Plain City, UT 84404
Michael S. and Trudi L. Budd
6141 W. 13900 S.
Riverton,UT 84065
Robert D. and Sheri D. Gonzales
5960 South TresslerRd.
Kearns,UT 84118
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